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Summary 
This report describes a spreadsheet tool designed to inform the allocation of health service funding 
to district councils in Malawi. The methods seek to allocate funds between districts so as to provide 
the opportunity of securing equal access to services for equal need for the interventions contained 
in Malawi ?Ɛ Essential Health Package (EHP). The relevant funding streams for allocation relate to the 
available budgets for drugs and other recurrent transactions (ORT), but excludes costs relating to 
personnel. 
 
Section 11 gives a brief introduction to the flow of funds in publicly funded health systems, and the 
rationale for using a funding formula to devolve funds to geographically defined administrative 
entities, such as the district councils in Malawi. It argues that the use of a formula can promote three 
classes of health system objective, related to efficiency, equity and politics. Funding formulae are in 
widespread use in developed countries, and are increasingly being applied in low and middle income 
settings. The intention of most formula is to estimate the expected costs to a locality of delivering 
some standard level of access to health services, assuming a standard level of efficiency (and, where 
appropriate, standard levels of user charges). 
 
Section 2 summarizes the budgetary arrangements for the health sector in Malawi. The principal 
budgetary streams to which the analysis in this report refers are the drugs and ORT budgets. 
Personnel budgets are the responsibility of the Department for Human Resources Management and 
Development, and are not considered further here. As well as government funds, there are 
significant financial contributions from donor funds and local revenue generation. The primary 
administrative function addressed in this report is the allocation of drug and ORT funds to 
geographically defined district councils. 
 
Malawi has a specified EHP comprising 106 interventions, arranged into 11 thematic headings. 
Whilst the EHP is intended to focus health system resources on the highest value interventions, the 
funds currently available at the national level are inadequate to secure 100% coverage of the EHP 
for all citizens in need. The resource allocation tool presented in this report seeks to allocate funding 
between districts on an equitable basis, so that each district can in principle deliver the EHP to its 
citizens to a uniform extent, as constrained by the nationally available funds. 
 
Section 3 outlines the principal features of most resource allocation mechanisms, indicating the 
technical and political choices that must be addressed when developing a formula. The issues 
covered include: specifying the objectives of the formula; defining the devolved entities in receipt of 
funds; specifying the services covered by the formula; counting the population; adjusting for 
population medical needs; measuring costs; and treating cross-border flows. 
 
The methods adopted are described in section 4. They first entail for each intervention specifying a 
target population group and multiplying by an estimate of the probability of requiring the 
intervention in a year. This is multiplied by an estimate of the unit cost of the intervention to derive 
the total spending need for that intervention in the district. The calculations for each intervention 
are summed to derive the total district allocation. This gives the costs of securing 100% coverage for 
all treatments. A variant of this model is developed by multiplying each treatment calculation by an 
ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞŽĨ ‘ƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ?ĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?ƚŽĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƚŚĂt there will be differences between districts in 
the extent to which they can secure 100% coverage. These methods are implemented in an 
extensive spreadsheet, which forms the principal output of this project. All allocations are presented 
as a percentage share of the national budget, so the formula can operate at whatever funding level 
                                                     
1 This section draws in part on the report Smith, P. (2008), Formula funding of health services: learning from experience in 
developed countries, Discussion Paper HSS/HSF/DP.08.1, Geneva: World Health Organization. 
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is available, with the implication that any shortfall in funding will be shared on an equal percentage 
basis across all districts. 
 
The results are summarized in section 5. Under the full coverage model, the relative per capita 
spending needs vary from about one third of the national average in one district, to about 5.6 times 
the national average in another, although this last is an outlier, and most districts lie within a much 
narrower range. Application of the main formula would imply some very large reductions from 
current levels of funding (over 50%) in four districts, and more than doubling of allocations to two 
ĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚƐ ?ĐŚĂŶŐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘ĨƵůůĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?ŵŽĚĞůƚŽƚŚĞ ŵŽƌĞ ‘ƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ?ĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞŵŽĚĞůǇŝĞůĚƐ
changes in allocations ranging from a decrease of 16% to an increase of 18%. 
 
Section 6 seeks to put the results in context. It notes the strengths of the Malawi arrangements, 
most notably the existence of the EHP and the associated costings, and the extent of available data 
resources. The discussion nevertheless raises further issues for development and clarification, and 
reiterates the need to treat the tool and the results as a basis for further dialogue rather than a 
definitive recommendation. 
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1. Introduction 
A key requirement for any health system is to ensure that the available public funds are directed to 
local organizations in line with health system objectives. Such funding seeks to give local institutions 
- such as local governments, local administrations and health authorities - both the financial capacity 
and the incentive to fulfil their objectives. This report focuses on one particular aspect of the 
financing mechanism: the use of mathematical formulae to determine the magnitude of funds 
directed towards local health agencies, with particular reference to District Councils in Malawi. The 
use of such formulae has become increasingly widespread in health care systems at all levels of 
development, and offers enormous scope for ensuring that funding is aligned with national health 
system policies. In particular, a systematic approach towards funding local agencies is an essential 
prerequisite of successful decentralization policies. 
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) has argued that national governments play a crucial 
stewardship role in ensuring that health service funds (from whatever source) are used efficiently 
and equitably, and that health care agencies are incentivized appropriately. Figure 1 offers a 
schematic representation of the flow of public funds implicit in the finance of most health systems. 
An important source of central government funds is taxation, paid in a variety of forms by citizens 
and businesses (A). This might in some low-and middle income countries be augmented by a variety 
of donor funds (G), creating a pool of revenue available to the central government. The government 
must then decide on how it will allocate the funds to support locally delivered health services, either 
wholly or in part. 
 
The central government might pay health care providers directly (E), as in the USA Medicare 
programme for older people. However, national governments usually devolve health care 
purchasing powers to local organizations, such as states or various forms of local government, local 
health authorities, health insurers, or voluntary bodies. We shall refer to these devolved institutions 
as local agencies, which take the form of District Councils in Malawi. They are often financed wholly 
or in part by grants-in-aid from the central government funding mechanism (B). 
 
 
Figure 1: The flow of funds in the health system 
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Local agencies may be solely reliant on national funds, but are often able to augment their revenue 
with local taxes (C), and sometimes donor funds allocated directly to the local agency (H). They then 
purchase services from providers (F). In some circumstances, the distinction between purchaser and 
provider may be unclear (for example, hospitals may be directly provided by local governments). 
However, even where there is no explicit payment mechanism, local agencies must in practice 
purchase their services from vertically integrated providers. Finally, the service user might pay a 
charge to the local agency or (more commonly) directly to the service provider (D). In some 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐƚŚŝƐƉĂǇŵĞŶƚŵŝŐŚƚƚĂŬĞƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨ ‘ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂů ?ƌĞŝŵďƵƌƐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ ?KĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ
the relative magnitude of all of these funding sources varies considerably between countries. 
 
This report is centrally concerned with just one of the funding flows represented in Figure 1: the 
mechanisms for funding local agencies, or purchasers of health services, from national revenues (B). 
dŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉƌŽďůĞŵŝƐƚŽĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƉĂǇŵĞŶƚŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƚŚĂƚ is aligned with and 
promotes its policy objectives. Flows other than B in the diagram are referred to only when they are 
material to this policy problem. 
 
The rationale for formula funding 
There are three broad reasons for adopting a formula funding approach, reflecting efficiency, equity 
and political objectives2. This section summarizes the rationale for formula funding under these 
three headings. 
 
Economic efficiency has a number of connotations. The two most fundamental notions are allocative 
efficiencǇ ?ƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĂƌĞŝŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ
managerial efficiency (the extent to which agencies perform functions at least resource cost). 
Formula funding is intended to address both aspects of efficiency. It seeks both to align resource 
allocations with national priorities, and to offer incentives that promote technically efficient 
practices amongst local agencies.  
 
Furthermore, by facilitating the creation of a fixed budget for local agencies, formula funding can 
help promote technical efficiency. By requiring that local services must be provided within the 
budget, local planners are encouraged to seek out and reduce inefficiencies in their systems. 
However, this incentive only works properly if there is adequate monitoring of the performance of 
the agencies, to ensure that services are delivered in line with intentions, and that efforts to improve 
efficiency do not result in unintended reductions in levels of output or quality. 
 
Systems of formula funding intrinsically seek to promote some concept of equity. The pursuit of 
equity might be valued for its own sake, or it might be valued because it secures acceptance for the 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĨƵŶĚŝŶŐƌĞŐŝŵĞĨŽƌůŽĐĂůĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ?/ƚŝƐƵƐ ĂůƚŽĚŝǀŝĚĞĞƋƵŝƚǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŝŶto the two 
broad principles of horizontal and vertical equity. A concern with horizontal equity suggests equal 
treatment of equals, whilst a concern with vertical equity suggests that those who are in more need 
(however that need is defined) should in some sense with higher priority. In practice, many stated 
equity principles are often vague or misleading.  
 
Therefore, when put into operation, equity principles usually translate into a more operationally 
tractable policy objective of enabling local agencies ƚŽĚĞůŝǀĞƌƐŽŵĞ ‘ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ?ďĞŶĞĨŝƚƉĂĐŬĂŐĞŽĨ
health services. The standard benefit package is usually defined in terms of a basket of health care 
and other services. The chosen benefit package implies a certain level of expected expenditure in 
each localŝƚǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĞƚĞƌŵƚŚĞĂƌĞĂ ?Ɛ ‘spending need ?. This will depend on the geographical, 
                                                     
2 Smith, P. (2003). Formula funding of public services: an economic analysis, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 19(2), 301-
322. 
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demographic, epidemiological, social and economic characteristics of the area. The characteristics to 
ďĞƚĂŬĞŶŝŶƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶĐĂůĐƵůĂƚŝŶŐĂŶĂƌĞĂ ?ƐĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞǁill be determined by data 
availability and the nature of the chosen package.  
 
The funding formula will usually indicate the total costs of delivering the stated benefits package (up 
to some standard of access and quality). In the absence of any other funding source, it is expected 
that the funds will be provided by the national government. However, it may be the case that local 
agencies have some access to funds from other sources, such as user charges, private patients, 
charitable donations and donor funds. If this is the case, then there is a need to calculate what 
ǁŽƵůĚďĞĂ ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ?ĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĨƵŶĚƐĨƌŽŵƐƵĐŚƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐŝƐĚĞĚƵĐƚĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞŽĨƚŽƚĂůĐŽƐƚƐƚŽŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŶĞƚůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚŚĞĨŽƌŵƵůĂŵŝŐŚƚ
assume a certain expected level of user charges for some services, if such charges are levied. 
 
Note that, if the local agency has some discretion over the nature of local health services, the 
objective is to enable local administrations the opportunity to deliver a standard level of service at a 
standard local tax rate, whilst charging users a standard charge (which may be zero). Local agencies 
may then have the freedom to vary some elements of the package of services (or user charges). It 
will then usually be the case that - if a local agency chooses (say) to augment the package, it must do 
so from within its available resources, and cannot expect additional funding.  
 
The formulaic approach to funding has become popular not just because it can lead to more efficient 
ĂŶĚĞƋƵŝƚĂďůĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚĐĂŶƐĞƌǀĞĂŚĞĂůƚŚƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ƐŵŽƌĞ
general objectives. Of course, those objectives often include equity and efficiency criteria. But they 
may also include important political considerations such as: allowing the criteria for funding to be 
set out explicitly; treating the budget-setting process systematically; promoting accountability; 
avoiding the need for case by case scrutiny of budgets; binding politicians, bureaucrats and other 
parties to a set of distributional rules; and helping to provide a non-partisan solution to intense 
political conflicts. 
 
A persistent feature of the political debates about funding formulae is the tension between the 
technical accuracy of formulae (intended to promote efficiency and equity) and a desire for 
simplicity (intended to promote political accountability). Politicians and the media frequently 
complain about the complexity of many funding mechanisms, and its adverse impact on 
accountability. At the same time, interest groups, politicians and localities also frequently complain 
ƚŚĂƚůŽĐĂů ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?ĂƌĞŶŽƚĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶĂĨƵŶĚŝŶŐŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵ ?dŚŝƐůĂĐŬŽĨ
sensitivity to local spending needs usually implies a wish to search for more intricate formulae which 
would reflect the special circumstances more satisfactorily.  
 
Many systems of formula funding include damping mechanisms  ?ŽĨƚĞŶƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ƉĂĐĞŽĨ
ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ? that reduce the year-on-ǇĞĂƌĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶĂŶŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐďƵĚŐĞƚ ?ƚŚereby lessening the 
immediate impact of the formula. For example, in England the original recommendations of the NHS 
Resource Allocation Working Party (RAWP) took 15 years to take full effect. Such damping serves 
two principal purposes: reducing political turbulence and reducing local organizational problems 
ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚďŝŐĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶĨƵŶĚŝŶŐ ?dŚĞǇĂƌĞƵƐƵĂůůǇĂƉƉůŝĞĚĂƐĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚĂĨƚĞƌ ‘ƉƵƌĞ ?
(undampened) budgetary targets are calculated using the resource allocation formula. 
 
Approaches to formula funding 
There are numerous ways in which the local allocation of health system funds could be determined, 
each with distinct advantages and disadvantages. At its crudest, the distribution could be based on 
political patronage, perhaps rewarding localities according to their political support in the past, or 
their importance for the government in the future. While politically desirable, this approach holds 
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no persuasive economic arguments. Another approach in widespread use is to distribute public 
funds to local health agencies according to historical precedent. Such mechanisms minimise year-on-
year disruption to existing services but leave the government hostage to history and perpetuates 
existing unfairness. A third possibility is to allocate funds according to bids submitted by localities, or 
to make allocations contingent on some measure of local performance. While this mechanism could 
be agreeable it is technically and administratively challenging. Finally, financial allocations could be 
made according to how much localities actually spend. This, however, creates perverse incentives 
encouraging excessive and inefficient expenditure. 
 
In practice, most systems of financing local health administrations contain an element of all four 
types of mechanism. As outlined, however, in many circumstances, such approaches contradict 
principles of good public finance, as they breach requirements of fairness, or encourage spending in 
excess of efficient levels. Therefore a fifth approach  ? allocation by mathematical formula  ? is 
increasingly becoming a favoured approach to determining local financial allocations. It can be 
defined in broad terms as the use of mechanical rules to determine in advance the level of public 
funds a devolved local agency should receive for delivering a specified health service.  
 
Under formula funding, mathematical rules that determine the magnitude of the funding received 
by a local agency are specified in advance. Those rules might be very simple (for example, a fixed 
amount of per capita funding per annum) or very complex. They might also be to some extent 
augmented by other funding mechanisms (for example, additional specific grants from the national 
government, or local taxes). The overarching objective of formula funding is to contribute to the 
creation of a budget for the local agency with which it is expected to fulfil its duties, in the form of 
organizing and/or purchasing local health services. 
 
There are two broad approaches to formula funding. The first reimburses the local entity on the 
basis of some measure of local activity, for example a count of the number of service users. Such 
case payment mechanisms are widespread in health care, for example using counts of inpatients, 
and the highly developed systems of diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) in place in many developed 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?dŚĞǇĂƌĞĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚǁŚĞŶĂŶƵŶĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌŽĨĂƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŶĞĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞ
service can be established. However, they can be vulnerable to perverse incentives to create 
unwarranted or inappropriate service utilization. &ƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?ŝĨƚŚĞĐĂƐĞƉĂǇŵĞŶƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚĐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ
ĂĐƚƵĂůĐŽƐƚŽĨƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐŵĂǇ ‘ĐƌĞĂŵ-ƐŬŝŵ ?ŽŶůǇůŽǁĞƌĐŽƐƚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐǁŝƚŚŝŶ
reimbursement groups. Case payment mechanisms have a useful role to play in funding some 
elements of local health care, especially for those parts of the health system for which a reliable 
count of the expected number of patients can be derived. Such counts can be derived from local 
surveys or modelling exercises, but should be as independent as possible from the actual data and 
performance of local providers, as they may otherwise be distorted by variations in existing provider 
performance. 
 
The second approach to formula funding reimburses local agencies according to the expected level 
of ůŽĐĂůĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĂƚĂďƌŽĂĚƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶůĞǀĞů ?dǇƉŝĐĂůůǇ ?ƚŚŝƐ ‘ĐĂƉŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚĂŬĞƐĂŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨ
ƚŚĞƐŝǌĞĂŶĚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐŽĨĂůŽĐĂůŝƚǇ ?ƐƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨƌŝƐŬĨĂĐƚŽƌƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ
levels of disease and poverty, and infers the expected level of local service expenditure, providing 
local agencies with a fixed budget without reference to actual local health service use. These 
methods have become known as capitation funding methods because they are based on population 
counts. They can circumvent some of the perverse incentives inherent in case payment, but their 
effectiveness depends on how successfully the capitation payments are adjusted to account for 
variations in population characteristics.  
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Whichever approach is adopted, three institutional requirements must be in place for formula 
funding to be relevant. First, the organization and purchasing of health services must be to some 
extent devolved to the local agencies. Second, there must be adequate data, available on a 
consistent basis across all local agencies, to which can be applied a mechanical formula that 
determines the level of funding to be allocated to those organizations. Third, there must exist some 
incentive to adhere to the financial allocation implied by the formula. Formula funding is a mere 
ritual if the recipients of funds can with impunity ignore the allocations implied by the limits.  
 
In the developed world, formula funding is becoming the dominant mechanism for devolving health 
system finances. Outside the United States, capitation methods have become ubiquitous as the 
means of funding devolved local governments, local health authorities or social health insurance 
funds, although the level of sophistication used varies markedly between countries. Increasingly the 
approach is being adopted in low and middle income countries. 
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2. DĂůĂǁŝ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚƐĞĐƚŽƌĂŶĚďƵĚŐĞƚ 
Since the Local Government Act (1998) and National Decentralisation Policy (1998) the Ministry of 
Local Government & Rural Development (MoLGRD) through district councils has been responsible 
for the delivery of health services at the district level. Consequently, the national health budget in 
Malawi is currently programmed through four channels otherwise known as budget votes, namely; 
Ministry of Health and central hospitals (Vote 310); District Councils (Vote 900); National Local 
Government Finance Committee (Vote 121); Subvented organisations (health regulatory bodies). 
Further, there are four main budget components; personnel emoluments (PE) budget; drug budget; 
other recurrent transactions (ORT) budget; development budget (Part I & Part II). 
 
As part of continued progress towards decentralisation, district councils had their PE budgets 
devolved to them in 2017/18. The Department for Human Resources Management and 
Development (DHRMD) is responsible for the allocation of districts ? PE budgets. The drug and ORT 
budgets are held by the National Local Government Finance Committee (NLGFC). Districts make drug 
requests to Central Medical Stores Trust (CMST), with the NLGFC paying CMST directly. The district 
councils, through the district health office (DHOs), allocate their health sector resources across the 
district between the district hospital, health centres, dispensaries, village clinics etc. The Ministry of 
Health holds its own PE and ORT budgets as well as the development budget for the health sector. 
Other cost centres like central hospitals (falling under Vote 310), Christian Health Association of 
Malawi (CHAM)3 facilities and the subvented organisation (e.g. Health Services Commission) receive 
their funding directly from the Ministry of Finance.  
 
Community, primary and secondary health care functions are devolved to district councils. However, 
tertiary care (central hospitals) are not devolved. Central hospitals serve a regional, as opposed to 
local, function acting as referral centres. To access services at a central hospital a patient must be 
referred from a lower level of care or, if not referred, pay a bypass fee. However, a vast majority of 
services provided at central hospitals remain primary care services. 
 
In addition to the national budget, health financing at district level benefits from donor finances and 
some local level revenue collection. District hospitals have paying wards which offer more privacy 
and reduced waiting times. The DHO retains the revenue generated through the paying wards for 
reinvestment in the district health system. Donors finance a significant proportion of the health 
sector, particularly interventions targeted at nutrition, HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. 
 
In 2017/18 the health budget in Malawi comprised the 3rd largest share of the total government 
budget (Education: 18.1%, Agriculture: 15.5%, Health: 9.9%). The health budget increased by 25% in 
nominal terms and 9% in real terms on the previous fiscal year. Despite this, a large proportion of 
the drug budget is often spent in the first six months of the fiscal year, leading to shortages and 
problems accessing treatment for patients. 
 
Current resource allocation formula 
The Ministry of Health currently uses historic allocations to determine the target share of the drug 
and ORT budget for each district council. The amount allocated to each council is annually adjusted 
by a proportion based on the total budget for allocation. As such, relative allocations to district 
councils rarely change, as can be seen in table 1.  
 
                                                     
3 Estimates suggest CHAM provides approximately one-ƚŚŝƌĚŽĨDĂůĂǁŝ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞ ? 
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Table 1: District Council Allocations 
District Council 
2017/18 Health 
Sector ORT 
budget  
2018/19 Health 
Sector ORT 
budget  
2017/18 Drug 
budget  
2018/19 Drug 
budget 
2018/19 PE 
budget  
Balaka  220,612,691 
                    
231,643,325  
                     
314,001,106  
                
400,912,126  
                   
912,601,208  
Blantyre  
            
514,375,365  
                    
540,094,134  
                     
732,117,599  
                
934,757,292  
                
2,198,962,080  
Chikwawa  
             
272,682,396  
                    
286,316,516  
                     
388,112,642  
                
495,536,676  
                
1,400,480,983  
Chiradzulu  
             
236,094,282  
                    
247,898,996  
                     
336,036,269  
                
429,046,308  
                
1,623,494,355  
Chitipa  
              
177,394,957  
                    
186,264,704  
                     
252,488,706  
                
322,373,973  
                   
693,139,718  
Dedza  
              
360,158,741  
                    
378,166,678  
                     
512,618,938  
                
654,504,537  
                
1,490,177,344  
Dowa  
              
314,752,843  
                    
330,490,485  
                     
447,992,092  
                
571,989,903  
                
1,532,251,872  
Karonga  
              
180,836,455  
                    
189,878,278  
                     
257,387,037  
                
328,628,092  
                
1,076,512,864  
Kasungu  
              
334,275,283  
                    
350,989,047  
                     
475,778,651  
                
607,467,385  
                
1,473,415,164  
Likoma  
                
48,183,841  
                      
50,593,033  
                       
68,580,730  
                  
87,562,896  
                     
38,026,200  
Lilongwe  
              
758,050,423  
                    
795,952,944  
                  
1,078,943,692  
            
1,377,579,892  
                
4,791,019,118  
Machinga  
              
252,896,102  
                    
265,540,907  
                     
359,950,534  
                
459,579,699  
                
1,439,273,673  
Mangochi  
              
418,765,014  
                    
439,703,264  
                     
596,034,059  
                
761,007,771  
                
1,921,967,370  
Mchinji  
              
261,985,886  
                    
275,085,180  
                     
372,888,149  
                
476,098,262  
                
1,768,457,144  
Mzimba North 
              
143,658,116  
                    
150,841,022  
                     
204,470,590  
                
261,065,128  
2,522,332,769 Mzimba South  
              
282,082,316  
                    
296,186,431  
                     
401,491,677  
                
512,618,838  
Mulanje  
              
316,457,737  
                    
332,280,624  
                     
450,418,692  
                
575,088,152  
                
1,766,597,534  
Mwanza  
              
148,531,085  
                    
155,957,639  
                     
211,406,355  
                
269,920,615  
                   
445,328,136  
Neno  
              
171,937,732  
                    
180,534,618  
                     
244,721,360  
                
312,456,736  
                   
657,162,480  
NkhataBay  
              
278,396,023  
                    
292,315,824  
                     
238,716,215  
                
304,789,453  
                
1,443,963,390  
Nkhotakota  
              
274,518,365  
                    
288,244,283  
                     
390,725,801  
                
498,873,121  
                
1,381,630,569  
Nsanje  
              
193,350,858  
                    
203,018,401  
                     
275,198,962  
                
351,370,103  
                   
911,434,972  
Ntcheu  
              
307,506,428  
                    
322,881,749  
                     
437,678,169  
                
558,821,233  
                
1,891,719,984  
Ntchisi  
              
169,212,977  
                    
177,673,626  
                     
240,843,179  
                
307,505,130  
                   
762,420,223  
Phalombe  
              
207,275,337  
                    
217,639,104  
                     
295,017,866  
                
376,674,597  
                   
652,435,851  
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Rumphi  
              
175,801,740  
                    
184,591,827  
                     
250,221,056  
                
319,478,670  
                   
763,021,828  
Salima  
              
240,046,159  
                    
252,048,467  
                     
341,661,031  
                
436,227,923  
                
1,554,360,136  
Thyolo  
              
360,055,014  
                    
378,057,765  
                     
512,471,302  
                
654,316,038  
                
1,279,806,729  
Zomba  
              
359,743,236  
                    
377,730,397  
                     
512,027,543  
                
653,749,452  
                
1,439,774,803  
Total 
         
7,979,637,400  
                
8,378,619,270  
              
11,200,000,000  
         
14,300,000,000  
             
39,831,768,497  
The PE budget for is unavailable in disaggregated form by district for 2017/18 
 
All Districts received a 5% and 28% increase to their ORT and drug budget respectively from 2017/18 
to 2018/19, resulting in each district receiving the same relative share of the budgets. 
 
Figure 2 shows the allocation of the drug and ORT budget across districts in per capita terms for the 
2018/19 fiscal year. The graph shows that the per capita allocation of budgets across districts is 
extremely variable. Likoma Island receives MK13,168 per capita while Mzimba north receives MK840 
per capita. The average district allocation per capita is MK2,094. 
 
Although this does not necessarily indicate that the distribution fails the principle of a needs-based 
allocation, as the health care needs of individuals are not homogenous, it does illustrate that under 
the current allocation mechanism, some districts would continue to benefit from hugely greater 
levels of spending per person than others.   
 
A district resource allocation formula was developed in 2008 but current allocation proportions 
diverge significantly from the recommendation allocation. This formula was based on five weighted 
factors; outpatient utilisation rate (15%), stunting percentage below -3 standard deviations (50%), 
bed capacity (15%), land area (5%) and infant mortality (15%). The aggregate health sector budget 
for reallocation was broken into subtotals according to these factor weights. Each district was then 
allocated a proportion of each subtotal commensurate with the proportional contribution of the 
district for that factor. 
 
Prior to 2000, distribution of the health sector budget across districts was based solely on population 
size. A more refined formula was developed in 2001/02 which considered factors such as OPD 
utilization, poverty and number of health facilities while placing a majority of the weight in the 
calculation on historical allocation. Recognizing that such a formula would result in perpetuating 
existing inequities, the formula was revised to exclude historical allocations and factor in population, 
poverty, under-5 mortality, remoteness, and presence of CHAM facilities and a district hospital (all 
factors assumed to be positively associated with healthcare costs). 
 
The Essential Health Package (EHP) 
The definition of the national EHP is intended to concentrate the scarce health sector resources of 
Malawi on a number of key health interventions to which the population can have free access to at 
the point of delivery. The latest revision of the EHP includes 106 interventions. The interventions are 
listed under the following thematic headings: 
 
x Reproductive Maternal Neonatal and Child Health (RMNCH) 
x Vaccine Preventable Diseases 
x Malaria 
x Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses (IMCI) 
x Community Health 
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x Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs) 
x HIV/AIDS 
x Nutrition 
x Tuberculosis (TB) 
x Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) 
x Oral Health 
 
See appendix for a more comprehensive description of the EHP. 
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Revision of the District Health Resource Allocation Formula 
The aim of the research is to produce options for an improved and updated mathematical formula to 
inform the distribution of the ORT and drug budgets for districts in Malawi. The budgets are 
intentioned for the provision of interventions included in the Essential Health Package (EHP). The 
formula should, therefore, seek to reflect local variations in need for health care services included in 
the EHP. To achieve this the study examines the factors associated with variations in need for EHP 
services. The options are intended to be suitable for potential implementation from the 2019/20 
Fiscal Year. 
 
As previously mentioned, DHOs are charged with purchasing primary and secondary health care 
services for their designated populations (the district population). The resource allocation formula 
calculated only addresses the distribution of resources to districts currently held by the National 
Local Government Finance Committee under Vote 121, namely districts drug and ORT budgets. How 
districts subsequently use these resources to purchase services from providers (health centres, 
district hospital, etc.) lies outside the scope of this work. In other words, the work examines the 
methods of capitation and risk-adjustment for the allocation of resources to district councils and 
excludes any consideration of the payment method of district councils to health care providers i.e. 
district hospitals, health centres etc.  
 
It is worth highlighting that Malawi is tentatively considering moving towards a system of Diagnosis 
Related Group (DRG) payments for central hospitals in the longer-term. However, this report 
addresses resource allocation given the present situation. This policy would, if enacted, only apply to 
central hospitals delivering tertiary and specialist services, whereas the resource allocation formula 
discussed in this paper is related to EHP services which consist of primary and secondary care 
services. Therefore, theoretically there should be limited interaction. 
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3. The elements of capitation funding 
This section outlines the rudimentary practical considerations that must be taken into account when 
developing a funding formula for health services. It first considers the objectives of the funding 
formula, choices about the agencies in receipt of funds, and the scope of the health services to be 
covered by the funding mechanism. It goes on to discuss the basic data issues associated with 
counting the population, and varying the cĂƉŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐŝŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?ŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞ
spending needs (so-called risk adjustment). It then briefly discusses the measures of costs to be used 
in any analysis. The section concludes with some observations on the statistical issues that arise 
when seeking to develop empirical funding formulae4. 
 
The objectives of the funding formula 
As noted earlier, funding formulae can have a number of implicit and explicit objectives relating to 
efficiency, equity and politics. It is essential that explicit and practical objectives are formulated 
when seeking to make an allocation system operational. In some systems, particularly those with 
competitive insurance arrangements, the prime objective is to secure efficiency in the operation of 
the insurance market. However, in most systems of national health insurance, the prime objectives 
usually relate to equity, an important requirement for promoting national solidarity and support for 
the health system.  
 
Equity objectives can take a number of forms, but the dominant approach used in formula funding 
has been to give local agencies the opportunity to provide some standard package of health services. 
This seeks to ensure that a citizen with a given level of health care need can expect to receive an 
equal level of access (at an equal price, if user fees are applied) wherever they live. Of course this 
ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶďĞŐƐƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚĂƚŝƐŵĞĂŶƚďǇ ‘ĞƋƵĂůhealth care ŶĞĞĚ ? ?ĂŶĚĐĂŶŐŝǀĞƌŝƐĞƚŽ
numerous methodological difficulties when seeking to make it operational. However, it has proved 
to be a robust and practical concept of equity that is in widespread use. We therefore use it as an 
underlying principle throughout this report. 
 
Entities in receipt of funds 
The next basic consideration in formula funding must be: to what local agencies are funds to be 
distributed? Often this is self-evident. However, there are circumstances when there are choices to 
be made about what organizations should be the target of funding, and to what level of 
responsibility to devolve funding. For example, in a federal state, there may exist municipalities, 
within larger local authorities, within provinces. A simple per capita funding mechanism may be 
adequate for distributing funds from central to provincial government, because the provinces have 
broadly similar demographic profiles, and because they have access to a range of other funding 
sources with which to abate any inaccuracies in estimates of spending need. However, the same 
formula may be completely inadequate for use at the municipal level, because of the much greater 
heterogeneity of social and demographic circumstances amongst those organizations, and the more 
serious implications of any inaccuracy in the formula. 
 
Financial risk is central to any consideration of the administrative level at which the finance is to be 
directed. Broadly speaking, larger entities are more able to absorb such risk than smaller entities, 
because any inaccuracy in the formula can be absorbed across a large population. In the same way, 
agencies such as general local governments, responsible for a broad range of public services, can 
more readily accommodate inaccuracies in the health services formula by spreading the risk across a 
                                                     
4 This section drew material from the following sources:  
Smith, P. (2008). Resource allocation and purchasing in the health sector: the English experience, Bulletin of the World 
Health Organization, 86(11), 884-888. 
Smith, P. (2007). Formula funding of public services, London: Routledge. 
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larger number of public services, or adjusting local taxes. In contrast, small, single purpose health 
agencies, reliant for all their income on formula funds, are placed at much greater risk, and so any 
formula will have to be correspondingly more accurate if serious inequities are to be avoided. In 
practice, of course, the choice of the entity is likely to be constrained and guided both by existing 
administrative structures, and by the practical data constraints. As mentioned, in the Malawi context 
we consider allocations to the district councils. 
 
Services covered by the formula 
A closely related issue is the set of health services and categories of expenditure for which funding is 
to be distributed. In principle, the formula should reflected the expected costs to a local agency of 
delivering a standard benefits package. However, there are numerous approaches to how this might 
be done. At one extreme, a formula might be based on line-by-line estimates of needs and costs for 
each element of the benefits package, possibly implying different formulae for each service in the 
package. This might entail using statistical models to derive unbiased estimates of the expected 
number of service users for each service. At the other extreme, a single broad formula might be 
used for all services, based on simple available metrics, such as demographic variables and mortality 
rates. In this report wherever feasible we use the first approach, based on Malawi ?Ɛ EHP described 
ĂďŽǀĞ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁĞĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐǁŝƚŚĂŶĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚďĂƐĞĚŽŶĂƐŝŶŐůĞ ‘ďƌŽĂĚďƌƵƐŚ ?ŝŶĚĞǆŽĨ
health care need based on the standardized mortality rate. 
 
Furthermore, note that the formula may not cover all the categories of expenditure associated with 
delivering the necessary service. For example, many systems of formula funding do not include 
allowances for items such as capital spending or medical training, which are frequently funded 
through other funding mechanisms. The funding formula we have been asked to examine for Malawi 
relates only to expenditure included in the drug budget and the ORT budget, and therefore excludes 
costs relating to personnel.  
 
Counting the population 
Capitation methods first require a verifiable count of population, disaggregated where necessary 
into demographic groups. Although the population count used in a capitation system is often 
uncontentious, it can give rise to difficulties when it relies on local reporting, as there are obvious 
incentives for local organizations to maximize the population on which their revenues are based.  
 
Disaggregation of the population into demographic groups is a fundamental requirement of most 
capitation methods, because age and sex are often important predictors of expected health care 
spending that are readily available from routine data sources. Indeed for some services (such as 
maternity services) an accurate estimation of the relevant demographic group (women of 
childbearing age in this case) may be the single most important element of the formula. 
  
Some citizens may not qualify for receipt of public health services, either because they are covered 
by other insƵƌĂŶĐĞĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŽƌďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞĐŚŽƐĞŶƚŽ ‘ŽƉƚŽƵƚ ?ŽĨƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ
and instead use private care. There may therefore be a case for excluding such citizens from the 
formula calculations. This principle can be rather hard to follow if citizens can exercise some choice 
as to whether or not to use public services, depending on the treatment they require and their 
personal preferences. In this case, some estimate must be made of the expected costs falling solely 
on public services. In effect, the possibility that an individual may not use public health services 
reduces the expected incidence of health care spending needs that are relevant to the public sector, 
and should in principle be taken into account. 
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Accounting for Local Needs - Risk adjustment 
Although counts of the population can be problematic, it is usually the process known as risk 
adjustment that leads to most technical debate. The purpose of risk adjustment is to reflect 
ǀĂƌŝĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐŶĞĞĚƐĨŽƌŚĞĂůƚŚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞĞǆpenditure, beyond simple demographic 
ĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ŝĨƚŚĂƚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŝƐƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ?ƉĂĐŬĂŐĞŝŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚĞŶƚŝƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ?/Ŷ
principle, this entails modelling the determinants of (a) the probability of requiring services and (b) 
the intensity of use associated with that need. In practice these two issues are usually concatenated 
into a single estimate of expected expenditure on an individual in a specified time period (usually a 
year). 
 
Key issues to address are the choice of characteristics ƚŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞĂƐ ‘ƌŝƐŬĂĚũƵƐƚĞƌƐ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ
weight to attach to each factor. Different technical choices can lead to major changes in payment 
rates, and there is often little methodological guidance for those seeking to design risk adjustment 
schemes.  
 
It is important to note that in many circumstances the range of satisfactory data available for risk 
adjustment purposes may be highly circumscribed. The first criterion in the design of risk adjustment 
will always be feasibility. Sometimes it may be possible to supplement the basic demographic 
disaggregation with epidemiological indicators, yielding richer and more refined predictions of 
spending need. For example, there may be reliable indicators of the numbers in the population 
suffering from certain diseases. However, such epidemiological refinement must be treated with 
caution. Its collection may be administratively demanding and it may be vulnerable to 
misrepresentation by local agencies. Furthermore, a high current prevalence of disease may be the 
ƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƉŽŽƌƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƐƚ ?ĂŶĚŝƚŵĂǇďĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŽĂǀŽŝĚ ‘ƌĞǁĂƌĚŝŶŐ ?ůŽĐĂůĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐĨŽƌ
poor historical performance.  
 
An alternative approach is to use statistical models to estimate the expected prevalence of the 
disease in question, rather than the measured prevalence. These models may use social, 
demographic and epidemiological data to estimate disease prevalence in each administrative area, 
and may have the advantage that they are estimated on a consistent basis and not reliant on local 
reporting. Sometimes such statistical models use data that are unrelated to specific diseases, but 
which are known to be correlated with need for health services. For example, the early approaches 
to resource allocation in England relied heavily on various forms of standardized mortality rates 
rather than epidemiological variables, which were either unreliable or not available.  
 
Even where potentially useful data do exist, there is frequently a tension in the design of formulae 
between a desire to model expected expenditure accurately, and a desire to avoid perverse 
ŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚŚĞďĞƐƚƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŽƌŽĨĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞŝƐŚŝƐ
or her previous history of expenditure and utilization. Such variables are often used in systems of 
competitive health insurance in order to model individual expenditure accurately5. However, policy 
makers in other countries have sought to avoid the use of such data in the design of health service 
formulae, on the grounds that they may offer a perverse incentive for providers to increase 
provision in order to secure an increased capitation payment for the individual in the future. 
 
Any proposed risk adjuster must be reliably and consistently recorded across all recipients of funds. 
There will often be a need for a strong audit function to reassure all localities that payments are fair. 
A suggestion that some localities are manipulating information may be seriously corrosive. For this 
reason, a national government may often feel unable to use some otherwise suitable metrics as risk 
adjusters because they cannot be satisfactorily verified. Risk adjusters should also be plausible, in 
                                                     
5 Wynand, P.M.M. Van den Ven, Ellis, R. (2000). Risk-adjustment in competitive health plan markets. 
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the sense of being manifest drivers of the need for health care services. Another persistent theme in 
the literature is the tension between parsimony in the use of risk adjusters and the need to model 
spending needs sensitively. Generally speaking, simple funding mechanisms are often preferred 
because they can be more readily understood and therefore promote accountability. However, 
there will often be an element of rough justice in a simple funding formula, so those local agencies 
ƚŚĂƚĨĞĞůƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĂĚǀĞƌƐĞůǇĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĐŚŽŝĐĞŽĨĂƐŝŵƉůĞŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵǁŝůůƉƌĞƐƐĨŽƌ ‘ƌĞĨŝŶĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?
in the form of an increased number of risk adjusters and added complexity. Balancing simplicity and 
sensitivity of the funding mechanism is a key role for the national government. 
 
In summary, numerous criteria for selecting risk adjustment characteristics have been indicated. For 
example, they should be: 
 
x feasible, with low administrative cost; 
x consistently, reliably, verifiably and universally recorded across all administrative areas; 
x not vulnerable to manipulation or fraud; 
x plausible predictors of expected health service expenditure; 
x encourage efficient delivery of health services, and be free from perverse incentives; 
x respect confidentiality requirements;  
x parsimonious predictors of the need for health services, thereby promoting 
transparency and accountability. 
 
In practice, this often severely limits the choice of variables, as in many situations there exists only 
very restricted information on the characteristics of individuals or areas that conforms to such 
criteria.  
 
Measuring costs  
Capitation formulae seek to model the expected annual costs associated with each individual, 
assuming he or she has access to the chosen standard benefit package. Loosely speaking, the 
estimation of those costs poses three broad modelling challenges: estimating the probability of the 
need for services; estimating ƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇ ?ŽĨƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƵƐĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĂƚŶĞĞĚ ?ĂŶĚĞƐƚŝŵĂƚŝŶŐ
the costs of providing those services. As discussed above, much of the methodological debate 
surrounds the first two of those challenges. However, it may also be important to model the third 
element  ? the costs to the local agency  ? with some care if there are significant legitimate input 
price variations between localities. 
 
If there are inescapable variations in the input prices paid by localities, then it is important that the 
formula reflects this accurately. For example, the wages necessary to attract skilled health care 
workers may vary greatly within some countries, so some cost variation between localities may be 
necessary to allow the standard benefits package to be delivered. It is important to note that the 
methodology to derive these adjustments should ideally avoid use of specific public sector input 
prices in the localities. To use local health service wage rates as a basis for a local area cost 
adjustment might encourage inefficiency, as it allows localities to increase pay above the level that is 
strictly necessary yet not suffer any budgetary consequences.  
 
The estimation of costs should also in principle reflect any cost sharing arrangements. For example, 
if the national government or a donor organization agrees to reimburse separately the local agency 
for costs on individual patients in excess of some threshold, the cost variable should be constructed 
so as to reflect the expenditure limit. Or if patients are expected to bear some of the costs of 
pharmaceuticals, the expected user charge should be reflected in a reduced estimate of net costs to 
the agency. In short, the measure of costs used in any modelling work should reflect only relevant 
costs falling on the local agencies. 
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Cross-border flows 
One final consideration that must sometimes be addressed occurs when patients who are the 
responsibility of one local agency (that is, who live within the borders of the health authority) use 
services provided by a different health authority. It will usually be the case that the net flow of cross-
border patients is not asymmetric, for example if patients in more rural areas tend to use facilities 
located in larger urban centres outside the borders of their local health authority. In principle, this 
complication is of little significance if there is a strict divide between the providers of services and 
the local agencies who fund them  ? ƚŚĞŶĨƵŶĚŝŶŐĐĂŶ ‘ĨŽůůŽǁƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐ
of where the provider is located. 
 
However, in many health systems, the provider is funded predominantly by a block contract with the 
local health authority, or is even owned by the authority. Then, if there is an inflow of patients from 
other localities, the provider might be expected to provide care to a population for which it is not 
adequately funded. In this case, there will often be a need for some adjustment to the allocations to 
local agencies to reflect cross-border flows. This could take the form of a bilateral transfer of funds 
ĨƌŽŵĂŶĂŐĞŶĐǇƚŚĂƚŝƐ ‘ĞǆƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ ?ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐƚŽƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚŝŶŐĂ ĞŶĐǇ. The transfer should reflect the 
net flow of patients between the localities.  
 
Such financial transfers may be based on the unit costs calculated as part of the funding formula. 
However, they do not require any change to the initial funding formula methodology. The initial 
calculations should reflect the spending needs of a locality regardless of where the patient receives 
services. The adjustment for any cross-border flows then entails a separate adjustment between 
individual local agencies, which will often be made only after the net flow of patients becomes 
known.   
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4. Methods 
Four variant resource allocation formulae were developed as part of this report; crude population, 
standardised mortality ratios, EHP intervention need and EHP intervention need augmented for 
implementation constraints. All the formulae calculate capitation payments attempting to capture 
expected district level expenditure with varying degrees of complexity. The first three formulae 
attempt to capture progressively more detailed information on drivers of health care need. The final 
formulae attempts to incorporate some measure of variations in district ?s ability to supply health 
ĐĂƌĞŽƌƚŚĞĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĂďŝlity to access care. 
 
i) Crude population allocation 
 
As outlined above, the simplest capitation method entails accounting only for the size of the 
population for which the local agency is responsible. The Population and Housing Census (2008) 
population projections were used to estimate district-level ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ figures6. The population 
projections provide gender and age disaggregated district level population figures in Malawi 
between 2008-2030. One district  ? Mwanza  ? was missing data on the age and sex distribution of its 
population7 ?ƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨDǁĂŶǌĂ ?ƐƚŽƚĂůƉƌŽũĞĐƚĞĚĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶǁĞƌĞĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƚŚĞ
distribution of its population across age and gender was simulated using the average distributions of 
all other districts. This requires the weak assumption that the age and gender distribution of 
Mwanza do not differ significantly to other districts in Malawi. In recognition of the plausibility of 
this assumption and the anticipated updating of the population estimates with the 2018 census data 
once available, this method was deemed acceptable. 
 
dŚŝƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ?ŝŶĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ƉƵƚƐĂĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚ ‘ƉƌŝĐĞ ?ŽŶƚŚĞŚĞĂĚŽĨĞǀĞƌǇĐŝƚŝǌĞŶ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐŽĨother 
characteristics, with the budget allocated across districts on the basis of their population counts. 
Given the combined 2018/19 drug and ORT budget, a value of MK1,485 is allocated to each citizen. 
As outlined above, health care needs of individuals clearly vary considerably depending on a number 
of factors, for instance age, morbidity or social factors. Expected health care expenditures are, 
therefore, not expected to be equal across all individuals in actuality. 
 
ii) Standardised mortality rates allocation 
 
The second scenario based allocations on district mortality rates. Mortality, one of the key 
component metrics of health (with morbidity), is frequently utilised as a proxy for health care need. 
However, comparing crude morality rates also captures differences in district demographic 
structures, notably the age distribution, as most causes of morality vary significantly with age. 
Populations with a significant number of very old or young individuals would be expected to have 
relatively higher mortality rates. 
 
Using age-sex standardised mortality rates corrects for between district variation in age and gender 
distributions, by calculating a weighted average of the age-sex specific mortality rates of a given 
population, thereby capturing only variations in mortality not attributing to these differences. 
District specific age-sex mortality rates (ASMR) are available from the Population and Housing 
census (2008), which were applied to district populations accordingly. Unfortunately the ASMR 
relate to 2007 and should be updated as soon as new data becomes available. However, as the 
interest is in the relative mortality rates of districts the relevance of the data relies on the weaker 
                                                     
6 It should be noted that a 2018 census is in the final stages of development and once available should be used to update 
district population estimates. 
7 The NSO was contacted in an attempt to obtain the raw data but we were unable to obtain a response and subsequently 
imputed the missing data. 
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assumption that the relative ASMR have remained constant over time rather than the absolute 
values. 
 
While the district age-sex disaggregated population figures clusters populations into 4 year windows 
i.e. 0-4, 5-9 etc. the ASMR relate to specific single year ages i.e. 0, 1, 5 etc. Therefore, the ASMR 
relates to the lower bound of the population age group. This has the likely effect of overstating the 
mortality rate for the youngest population clusters and marginally understating it for all other 
clusters. 
 
Age-sex specific mortality rates per 1,000 and number of deaths were calculated for each age cluster 
in each district. The standard population used was the aggregation of the age-gender specific 
populations. The age-sex specific mortality rates per 1,000 for each district was then applied to this 
standard population to give the expected number of deaths by age and gender for each district 
assuming a common demographic distribution.  
  ൌ    
 
Once the expected number of deaths for each district is calculated, this can act as a proxy for 
relative need with the budget allocated according to the proportion of expected deaths in each 
district. 
 
While using the standardised mortality rate improves on the per capita formula by capturing district 
variations in mortality, separate from their demographic structure, there remain a number of issues. 
As previously outlined, the formula should reflect the expected cost of delivering a standard package 
of services local agencies are expected to provide. Therefore, while the above formula based on 
standardised mortality rates may bring the district allocation closer in line with districts relative 
health care need than a per capita allocation, it does not account for the services districts are 
expected to provide. 
 
iii) EHP intervention need (full coverage)  
 
As previously stated, in Malawi, the EHP outlines the services expected to be provided free at the 
point of access, and therefore any allocation of resources should be associated with the expected 
costs of providing these services.  
 
In this scenario, calculation of district capitation payments was based on the expected EHP 
expenditure each district faced in a given fiscal year. Districts expected expenditure on each EHP 
intervention is a factor of two variables; the number of patients requiring treatment with the 
intervention and the unit cost of providing the intervention. The number of patients requiring 
treatment with the intervention is itself a function of the population size of those targeted to receive 
the intervention within the district and the percentage of the target population in need of the 
intervention. For instance, the target population for management of eclampsia is pregnant women, 
of which 1.80% are expected to require the procedure. The district expected expenditure on this 
intervention is then 1.80% of the pregnant women living within the district boundaries multiplied by 
the unit cost of providing the intervention. In order to undertake the calculations EHP interventions 
were grouped according to their thematic areas as outlined in the Health Sector Strategic Plan II 
(2017-2022). The total expected expenditure for each thematic grouping was totalled by district. The 
total district expected EHP expenditure is then the aggregation of the expected expenditure by each 
thematic group. 
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Methodology for calculating expected intervention expenditure (full coverage) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to scale the expected EHP expenditures down to the size of the budget available for 
ĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĞĂĐŚĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ,WĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞǁĂƐĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞĚ ?ǁŝƚŚ
districts assigned the corresponding proportion of the total budget available.  
 
Intervention unit costs were based on pre-existing data outlining the drug and supplies cost of EHP 
interventions. Unit costs were calculated by multiplying the unit cost of drugs and commodities 
required for each intervention by the units required per person per year and the proportion of 
patients who receive each commodity, giving a cost per person per year. 
 
Target populations for interventions were guided by target populations specified in the Health 
Sector Strategic Plan II (HSSPII) (2017-2022) for each EHP intervention. However, calculation of 
district specific target populations was required. Further, on a number of occasions the HSSPII 
indicated target population was deemed excessively vague and more specific target populations 
were calculated.  
 
Target populations were calculated in a variety of ways based on data availability. Many target 
populations referred simply to specific age groups, for example, children aged under 5. For such 
cases, districts corresponding age cluster was extracted from the Population and Housing Census 
(2008) using the 2018 district population projections. For some interventions more specific target 
populations were outlined requiring particular calculations and assumptions. Table 2 outlines how 
each target population used was calculated8.  
 
A number of general assumptions were required in the calculation of the expected intervention 
expenditure by district. First, it is assumed that all individuals within a district who require an 
intervention receive it. Second, the population in need (PIN) for each intervention is constant across 
districts. Third, there is no variation in the cost of delivering a specific intervention i.e. the cost of 
treating each individual with a given intervention is constant or the cost reflects a representative 
average cost of treatment for the intervention. 
                                                     
8 It should be noted that some alternative calculations of target populations using different methodologies are presented in 
the spreadsheets in order to show how different methodologies and data given different figures. It is the choice of the 
stakeholders which data and methodology they deem most reliable. 
Numbers patients 
requiring intervention 
Cost per person per year 
by intervention 
Target population size (#) 
Total expected 
expenditure on 
drugs and 
commodities for 
intervention 
Target population in need 
(PIN) of the intervention (%) 
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Table 2: Selected target population calculations 
Target population Data source & calculation Assumptions 
Pregnant women Data:  
- Females 15-49 years (Population & Housing Census, 2008)  
- % women aged 15-49 pregnant (Demographic & Household Survey, 2015/16) 
 
Calculation: 
 	 ? ?െ  ? ? ൈ ൬ ?  ? ?െ  ? ? ? ? ? ൰ 
 
- No women outside the age range 15-49 are 
pregnant or the proportion of women pregnant 
outside this age range is proportional across 
districts. 
- Data was not available on the percentage of 
women pregnant in Blantyre, Lilongwe, Mzuzu 
and Zomba city. The percentage from their 
corresponding district was used.  
Births Data: 
- Live births (2016) (District Health Information System 2) 
 
Calculation: 
 
N/A 
 
Population >15 
years who 
suffered fever or 
malaria in past 2 
weeks 
Data: 
- Proportion who suffered incidence of sickness in past 2 weeks (Integrated Household Survey 4, 
2016/17) 
- Of those who suffered sickness proportion who suffered malaria or fever (Integrated Household 
Survey 4, 2016/17)  
- Population >15 (Population & Housing Census, 2008) 
 
Calculation: 
 ൬ ? ? ? ? ൰ ൈ ൬ ?  ? ? ? ൰ ൈ  ൐  ? ? 
 
- Assumption that the 2 week period in which the 
survey was taken does not suffer any systematic 
differences with the rest of the year which 
effect the geographical distribution of malaria. 
Population 0-4 
years who 
suffered fever or 
malaria in past 2 
weeks 
Data: 
- Proportion who suffered incidence of sickness in past 2 weeks (Integrated Household Survey 4, 
2016/17) 
- Of those who suffered sickness proportion who suffered malaria or fever (Integrated Household 
Survey 4, 2016/17)  
- Population 0-4 years (Population & Housing Census, 2008) 
 
- Assumption that the 2 week period in which the 
survey was taken does not suffer any systematic 
differences with the rest of the year which 
effect the geographical distribution of malaria. 
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Calculation: 
 ൬ ? ? ? ? ൰ ൈ ൬ ?  ? ? ? ൰ ൈ  ? െ  ? 
Number of 
children <5 years 
-3 standard 
deviations below 
weight-for-age 
Data: 
- Children < 5 years (Population & Housing Census, 2008) 
- Proportion of children <5 years -3 standard deviations below weight-for-age (Demographic & 
Household Survey, 2015/16) 
 
Calculation: 
  ൏  ? ൈ ൬ ? ൏  ? െ  ? െ െ  ? ? ? ൰ 
 
- This target population is applied to the nutrition 
ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ‘ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƐĞǀĞƌĞ
ŵĂůŶƵƚƌŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?/ŶƚŚĞ,WƚŽŽůƚŚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ
had a target population children 1-59 months 
with a population in need of 1.15%. As the 
average proportion of children <5 -3 SD below 
weight-for-age across all districts is 2.5% this 
was deemed a usable replacement for the target 
population with a new assumed 100% 
population in need. The intention is this would 
capture more of the district variation in 
expected expenditure for this intervention. 
Number of 
children <5 years 
not fed minimum 
dietary diversity 
Data: 
- Children < 5 years (Population & Housing Census, 2008) 
- Proportion of children aged 6-23 months fed minimum dietary diversity (Demographic & 
Household Survey, 2015/16) 
 
Calculation: 
  ൏  ? ൈ ൬ ? ? െ  ? ? ? ? ? ൰ 
 
- Assumes the proportion of children fed 
minimum dietary diversity is constant for those 
aged 6-23 months and those aged <5 years, or 
at least the relative proportions across districts 
are constant. 
HIV+ population Data: 
- Population 15-49 years (Population & Housing Census, 2008) 
- HIV prevalence among population 15-49 years (Demographic & Household Survey, 2015/16) 
 
Calculation: 
  ? ?െ  ? ? ൈ O?O? O? ? ?െ  ? ? ? ? ? O? 
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Pregnant women 
with HIV/AIDS 
Data: 
- Females 15-49 years (Population & Housing Census, 2008)  
- % women aged 15-49 pregnant (Demographic & Household Survey, 2015/16) 
- HIV prevalence among population 15-49 years (Demographic & Household Survey, 2015/16) 
 
Calculation: 
 ൭	 ? ?െ  ? ? ൈ ൬ ?  ? ?െ  ? ? ? ? ? ൰൱  ൈൈ O? O? ? ?െ  ? ? 
 
 
 
 
Population with 
mental illness 
Data: 
- Proportion of population chronically illness (Integrated Household Survey, 2016/17) 
- Of those chronically ill, proportion with mental illness (Integrated Household Survey, 2016/17) 
- Population (Population & Housing Census, 2008) 
 
Calculation: 
 ൬ ? ? ? ? ൰ ൈ ൬ǡ  ? ? ? ? ൰ ൈ  
- As this target population is applied to treatment 
of depression there is an assumption that 
depression is distributed across districts in 
proportion to all mental illness. 
Population with 
epilepsy  
Data: 
- Proportion of population chronically illness (Integrated Household Survey, 2016/17) 
- Of those chronically ill, proportion with epilepsy (Integrated Household Survey, 2016/17) 
- Population (Population & Housing Census, 2008) 
 
Calculation: 
 ൬ ? ? ? ? ൰ ൈ ൬ǡ  ? ? ? ? ൰ ൈ  
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iv) EHP intervention need (realistic coverage)  
 
The final scenario builds on the previous scenario by removing the assumption that all patients 
requiring an intervention are treated. Instead, an estimate of the national average attainable 
coverage level for each intervention is applied for all districts. The attainable coverage level is the 
proportion of individuals in need of the intervention who could receive it on the basis of current 
constraints in the national health care system.  These may operate both on the supply side, in terms 
ŽĨƚŚĞŚĞĂůƚŚƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽĚĞůŝǀĞƌĂŶŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚŽŶƚŚĞĚĞŵĂŶĚƐŝĚĞ ?through the 
limited update by those with capacity to benefit from an intervention.   
 
We drew upon estimates of attainable coverage levels used in the development of the Malawian 
Essential Health Package9. These were mainly estimated by disease and were only available at the 
national level. This replaces the assumption of full coverage with an assumption that attainable 
coverage for each intervention is constant across all districts, but varies by intervention type.  It 
leads to changes in percentage allocations to districts because the epidemiology of diseases (e.g. 
prevalence, incidence) differs across districts. This approach aims to adjust allocations based upon 
the potential for resources to be productively used in the direct delivery of interventions, some of 
which can be delivered at greater levels of coverage than others. 
 
Methodology for calculating expected intervention expenditure (realistic coverage) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This approach could be further developed by using a variable reflecting variations in attainable 
intervention coverage by district. The Integrated Household Survey 2016/17, for instance, includes a 
variable of self-reported difficulty in accessing care due to distance from a facility by district. This 
would allow for greater variations in coverage across districts, but would assume constant coverage 
across interventions. However, although such an approach could be useful in that resources would 
less likely be committed to districts that may struggle to utilize them, it would penalize districts with 
more limited current health system capacity. Whereas this may partly be justified because increasing 
attainable coverage through infrastructural expansion (e.g. construction of new clinics) is unlikely to 
be feasible in the short term, in reality district management teams have a limited range of options to 
support intervention outreach efforts. 
 
 
                                                     
9 Ochalek, J. Revill, P. Manthalu, G. McGuire, F. Nkhoma, D. Rollinger, A. Schulpher, M. Claxton, K. (2018). Supporting the 
development of a health benefits package in Malawi, BMJ Global Health, 3:e000607. 
Numbers patients 
requiring intervention 
 
Cost per person per year 
by intervention 
Target population size (#) 
Total expected 
expenditure on 
drugs and 
commodities for 
intervention 
 
Target population in need of 
the intervention (%) 
Realistic coverage of 
intervention (%) 
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Assumptions and Limitations 
There are a number of general assumptions and shortcomings in all the resource allocation formulae 
presented which warrant discussion. All of the scenarios assume that district populations are 
geographically captive populations who both live and seek health care within a single district. This 
may not be the reality faced by many districts where populations migrate across district borders in 
order to seek care. This is particularly true for urban districts which include referral hospitals. 
However, without reliable data on cross-border flows for health care seeking, it is not possible to 
currently incorporate this phenomenon into any resource allocation formula. As previously noted, 
the population in need for interventions is assumed to be constant in each district, as there is no 
source of data which provides an indication of variations in of the population in need between 
districts. One solution to this has been to attempt to define as specifically as possible the target 
population for each intervention for each district. Doing so reduces the influence that the population 
in need has on the final calculation of patients requiring provision of an intervention. However, this 
has not been possible in aůůĐĂƐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐƌĞŵĂŝŶ ‘ƚĂƌŐĞƚĞĚ ?ĂƚĂŶĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ
proportion of the whole population. 
 
Population projections are available for Mzuzu, Lilongwe, Blantyre and Zomba city. However, much 
of the epidemiological data such as HIV prevalence rates only exist at the district level. As such, 
separate estimates of expected EHP expenditure have been calculated for these cities under the 
assumption that such rates are constant across the rural and urban parts of their district. For 
instance, if the HIV prevalence rate is outlined as 7.2% in Lilongwe, it is assumed this is constant for 
Lilongwe rural and city. This strong assumption can be questioned, but without further data on 
variations in prevalence is unavoidable. 
 
None of the formulae account for variations in non-government provision of health care across 
districts or district access to funds from non-governmental sources or own revenue generation 
capabilities. CHAM and private facilities may not be uniformly distributed across the country and 
therefore certain districts may benefit from greater proportions of their target population being 
treated by non-government providers. 
 
Finally ?ĂůĂƌŐĞƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŚĞĂůƚŚƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?ƐƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĂƌĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚďǇĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĚŽŶŽƌƐ ?,Žǁ
much influence the Ministry of Health has on the allocation of these resources is open to debate. A 
recent resource mapping exercise estimates donor contributions to drug and commodities costs as 
exceeding 90% (RMNCH, Malaria, Nutrition) for some disease programmes. The above scenarios 
make assumptions around the flexibility of the aggregate drug and ORT budgets. In reality, some 
ƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĞďƵĚŐĞƚƐŵĂǇŶŽƚďĞĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĨŽƌ ‘ƌĞĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚƐŽƌ
programmes from the current situation. Scenarios acknowledging the possible constraints in 
resource flexibility and subsequent allocation implications could be explored as part of any further 
work on resource allocation in Malawi.  
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5. Results 
We must underline that the primary output of this project is the spreadsheet containing the data 
and calculations made in deriving a set of district allocations using a particular set of assumptions. 
We see the spreadsheet as a tool with which Malawi policy makers can test alternative models and 
assumptions in moving towards a preferred funding formula. The results obtained using the 
assumptions set out in section 4 are merely illustrative, and could be used as a baseline against 
which alternative formulations can be tested. In this section we set out the results obtained, but 
must emphasize that we are in no way recommending that these should be adopted as future 
allocations. Instead we hope that the spreadsheet can be used as a tool to refine, challenge and 
augment the methods recommended in this report.  
 
The methods used have wherever possible applied the principles used for costing the EHP at the 
national level. As discussed in section 4, these entail, for each intervention in the package, 
identifying a target population, and multiplying by the probability of requiring the treatment and the 
ƵŶŝƚĐŽƐƚ ?dŚĞ ‘ĨƵůůĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?ǀĂƌŝĂŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŵŽĚĞůĂƐƐƵŵĞƐ ? ? ?A?ƵƚŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶďǇĂůůƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽŶĞĞĚ
ƚŚĞƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ?dŚĞ ‘ƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?ǀĂƌŝĂŶƚŵĂŬĞƐĂĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĂĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞreduced 
probability of a person in need of the treatment actually securing access, in line with the current 
national coverage levels for each specific intervention.  
 
EŽƚĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞďƵĚŐĞƚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐĨŽƌďŽƚŚƚŚĞ ‘ĨƵůůĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?
scenarios appear to be greatly in excess of the national budget currently available. This implies that 
the chosen EHP may not be currently fully funded, although the multiple funding sources available in 
Malawi make this difficult to verify. Consequently all capitation payments will be less than expected 
expenditure for all individuals. However, throughout the spreadsheet and this report, we report the 
share of the national budget allocated to each district under the different scenarios, and not the 
ĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ ?Ɛabsolute budget. Therefore we implicitly assume that, in the event of a national budget 
shortfall, each district receives an equal proportionate reduction in the allocation implied by the 
funding formula. The intention of the risk adjusted capitations under these circumstances is that 
they reflect the relative health care expenditure needs of individuals and districts. There are other 
methods of sharing the burden of keeping within the available budget, which could be applied 
within the model. However, we do not explore them further in this report. 
 
In order to facilitate discussion of the principles underlying the methods, this report does not 
identify the districts by name. Access to the spreadsheet will allow scrutiny of the impact on 
individual districts, but in this brief results summary, we have chosen to focus on the broad impact 
of the models on budgetary allocations. Note that we identify spending need for EHP services from 
whatever source of funding is actually used, whether government funds, donor funds, or other 
sources. 
 
Figure 3 summarizes the per capita estimates of spending need for EHP services relative to the 
national average (which is 1.0). It varies from about one third of the national average in one district, 
to about 5.6 times the national average in another. This outlier result appears to arise from very high 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the affected district. Most districts lie within the range of from half to 
twice the national average. 
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Figure 3: District spending need for EHP services relative to the national average 
 
Figure 4 indicates the percentage change from current allocations implied by the full EHP need 
funding formula amongst the districts. It implies some very large reductions (over 50%) in four 
districts, and more than doubling of allocations to two districts. These are of course very large 
swings that could not be contemplated in a single budgetary round, but they do indicate the highest 
ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚƐĨŽƌĨƵƚƵƌĞďƵĚŐĞƚĂƌǇŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƐ ?dŚĞŝƐƐƵĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƉĂĐĞŽĨĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?ŽĨŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐ
any new formula is discussed further in the concluding section below. 
 
 
Figure 4: Shift in budgetary share implied by use of the EHP formula (% change) 
 
Figure 5 shows the percentage changes to district allocations that occur when moving from the full 
ĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞŵŽĚĞůƚŽƚŚĞŵŽƌĞ ‘ƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ?ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚspecific intervention coverage. The 
changes range from a decrease of 16% to an increase of 18%, reflecting the budgetary shifts that 
ǁŽƵůĚŽĐĐƵƌŝĨĂĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶǁĞƌĞŵĂĚĞƚŽŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ‘ĞĂƐĞŽĨdelivery or ĂĐĐĞƐƐ ?ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĂůůŽĐĂƚŝon. 
We are not necessarily recommending this as an option, but include it to demonstrate the 
implications of making such a change to the modelling assumptions.  
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Figure 5 P^ŚŝĨƚŝŶďƵĚŐĞƚĂƌǇƐŚĂƌĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ?ĨƵůů ?,WŶĞĞĚĨŽƌŵƵůĂĂŶĚ ?ƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ?,WŶĞĞĚformula 
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6. Discussion 
This report has introduced a spreadsheet tool designed to inform the allocation of health care 
funding to district councils in Malawi.  The methods seek to allocate funds between districts so as to 
provide the opportunity of securing equal access to services for equal need for the interventions 
ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚŝŶDĂůĂǁŝ ?Ɛ,W ?dŚĞĨƵŶĚŝŶŐƌĞůĂƚĞƐƚŽƚŚĞĂǀĂŝů ďůĞďƵĚŐĞƚƐĨŽƌĚƌƵŐƐĂŶĚKZd ?ĂŶĚ
therefore excludes costs relating to personnel, infrastructure or medical equipment. The methods 
provide estimates of the spending needs within these budget categories without explicit 
consideration of the sources of funding (government, donors, NGO, patients etc), so when applying 
the model specifically to assess government spending need, receipts from other sources may need 
to be deducted. 
 
The methods used conform to widely accepted approaches to capitation funding of health services. 
The underlying assumption is that districts should be given the opportunity to deliver a standard 
level of health services, given the expected level of health care need in their populations. In making 
this concept operational, and in contrast to many health systems, Malawi has the advantage of an 
explicit, costed health benefits package (the EHP), which can act as the fundamental basis for 
informing resource allocation to districts.  
 
Nevertheless, as with all funding formula initiatives, the methods adopted were to some extent 
constrained by the nature and availability of relevant data. In this respect, Malawi is particularly 
strong, enabling us to prepare many detailed estimates at the district level of disease prevalence and 
associated indicators of needs and access. Nevertheless, some of the data items rely on self-
reporting or administrative utilization data, which may be misleading. Many systems of formula 
funding implicitly rely instead on estimates of disease prevalence and incidence arising from national 
statistical models. Although modelled estimates of disease prevalence are less direct than reported 
levels, they are prepared on a consistent basis, and may remove some of the biases that can arise in 
reported data. Future implementation of the tool may therefore consider use of modelled rather 
than reported prevalence for some diseases. 
 
The methods were able to take advantage of existing estimates of the unit costs of treatment that 
fall on the drugs budget. There was therefore no need to resort to econometric estimates of 
expected costs, the approach adopted in many countries without an explicit health benefits package. 
Whilst this was a major benefit of the Malawi administrative arrangements, it may nevertheless be 
the case that there do exist some legitimate variations in the unit costs of delivering services across 
the country. Although such variations are likely to be most pronounced for personnel costs, which 
are not considered in the current formula, future work might explore the relevance to the budgets 
covered by the drugs and ORT formula. 
 
Note that the allocations do not necessarily ensure that the EHP can be delivered in each district. 
Securing that objective would require that access to services and managerial efficiency were 
equalized across the country, which is unlikely to be feasible at least in the short run.  
 
Furthermore, estimates of spending need are first calculated without reference to the actual 
national resources available. Our baseline scenario assumes 100% coverage of all items in the EHP, 
which is clearly infeasible both financially and practically. As a consequence, results are presented as 
ĞĂĐŚĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ ?Ɛshare of the national budget, whatever that budget may be. As noted in section 5, this 
implicitly assumes that, in the event of a national budget shortfall, each district receives an equal 
proportionate reduction in the allocation implied by the funding formula. That is, the approach 
assumes that the reductions in coverage required due to the funding shortfall are (in a financial 
sense) shared equally across the districts. There are other valid methods of sharing the burden of 
keeping within the available budget, which could be applied within the model. For example, there 
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could be a requirement that some priority treatments are funded assuming 100% coverage, 
requiring larger proportionate reductions in other service funding. Such an approach would require 
Ă ‘ǁŝƚŚŝŶ,WƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?ĂƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂůƚĂƐŬŝƚƐĞůĨ ?EŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞ
scenarios outlined in this report have inferred any sort of prioritisation among EHP interventions.  
 
Alternatively, funding from other (non-government) sources could be deducted before rescaling 
district allocations to conform to the national budget. This becomes particularly important when 
external contributions are unevenly distributed across districts and EHP interventions, as is typically 
been the case in Malawi. Another potential exclusion from EHP cost estimation is central 
government funding for specific programs. In the context of Malawi, this would include commodity 
costs for family planning and immunization programs, which are financed centrally. However, we 
have not explored such alternatives in this report. Regardless of method chosen, the work further 
highlights that the aggregate magnitude of district budgets is below that required to deliver the 
services with which they are charged. This may facilitate conversations around reallocations from 
expenditures at the central level of the health care system, in development partner allocations or 
even from outside the health sector.  
    
The tool does not currently consider cross-border flows of patients between districts (or indeed 
from or to other countries). As noted in section 3, if the costs of services for some patients in one 
district are borne by services funded by another district, there is no conceptual difficulty in handling 
such cross-border flows within a funding formula. It necessitates an adjustment to allocations by 
transferring funds from one district to another to reflect the net flows of patients and the services 
they use. The main difficulty, therefore, is obtaining accurate estimates of net patient flows and 
cross-border patterns of health care utilisation. Indeed the parameters used in the funding formula 
can be used as the basis for such transfers. However, the adjustment for cross-border flows can be 
applied after calculation of the main funding formula model, and does not necessitate any changes 
to the formula methodology.    
 
As noted above, the budgets covered by the formula do not include personnel costs. This may have 
consequences for the drugs and ORT formula if, for example, a shortage of personnel in a district 
inhibit improvements in coverage of some treatments in the EHP. Ideally, and over time, we would 
recommend that personnel costs are included in the formula (even if they continue to be paid by the 
national government) as this will help to align the separate revenue streams.  
 
Further, as mentioned, the estimation of costs should ideally reflect any cost sharing arrangement. 
Section 3, the elements of capitation funding, can provide insights into where further amendments 
to the capitation formula may be considered. One avenue which may be pursued, for which data 
might be available, is the inclusion of cost sharing with CHAM. It is known that government only pays 
70% of the pre-agreed cost of CHAM services under the newest memorandum of understanding 
(MOU). A starting point for inclusion in the formula would be to examine the variations in the 
proportion of CHAM facilities with active service level agreements in each district compared to 
public facilities. If an estimate can be made of the proportion of total services in each district are 
delivered by these facilities, a cost adjustment can be made to closer match the required public 
health sector expenditure requirements. Similarly, although the model assumes that local 
governments are fully responsible for the purchase of primary and secondary health services, central 
(tertiary) hospitals often provide these services as well. Deducting central hospital contributions 
from the formula could, however, be problematic as it would legitimize the provision of non-tertiary 
care at these centres, which takes away from capacity for the delivery of tertiary care in the country. 
 
The scenarios presented in the current version of the spreadsheet tool imply some major changes in 
budgetary allocations for some districts. It is likely that immediate implementation of changes of 
30  CHE Research Paper 159 
such magnitude would be both managerially and politically infeasible. Therefore any 
implementation of a new funding formula will probably require seƉĂƌĂƚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨĂ ‘ƉĂĐĞŽĨ
ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?ƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚůŝŵŝƚƐƚŚĞǇĞĂƌ-on-year losses and gains to the budgets of individual districts. 
The specification of such a policy is more of a political rather than a technical undertaking, but would 
best be developed through a dialogue between political and technical advisors. The policy might 
place percentage limits on budget losses and gains in any one year, but could include more 
ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽƵƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐĂĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ ?ƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞůĞǀĞůƐ ?ƚƚŚĞ very least, the 
funding formula can indicate to which districts any new money might be best directed to promote 
system objectives.  
 
This work on the resource allocation formula to district councils touches on a number of areas that, 
while not strictly relevant, are worth mentioning. This work has been explicit in the fact that the 
formulae outlined relate only to the allocation of resources to district councils. Once at district level, 
there is a high degree of local autonomy as to how those resources are spent. This local autonomy is 
often seen as valuable, allowing districts  ? with greater local information  ? to react to local 
circumstances. Further, as mentioned, following strict allocation rules at a smaller geographical level 
increases the likelihood of unpredictable variation requiring mechanisms to absorb unanticipated 
departures from the capitation.  
 
Finally, we must emphatically reiterate that the results arising from the application of the 
ƐƉƌĞĂĚƐŚĞĞƚĂƌĞŶŽƚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂƐŽƵƌ ‘ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?Zather the tool and its results are 
presented as a starting point for policy makers in Malawi to refine, validate and challenge the 
underlying methods, assumptions and data. It is likely that an extensive dialogue between policy 
makers at national and local level will be needed before agreement can be reached on the most 
suitable way of calculating district budgetary allocations. However, we do believe that the tool 
presented here can serve as a useful mechanism for informing that dialogue. 
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Appendix 
The definition of a standard health benefits package, delivered free at the point of access, was first 
developed in 2004 in the Programme of Work (2004-2010). The package was revised in 2010 and 
delivered under the Health Sector Strategic Plan (2010-2016) with the current EHP being defined in 
2017 for delivery under the Health Sector Strategic Plan II (2017-2022).  
 
The objective of the EHP is stated as  ‘to ensure timely universal free access to a quality Essential 
Health Package, irrespective of ability-to-pĂǇ ?ƚŽĂůůƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶDĂůĂǁŝ ? ?(HSSP II, 2017-2022). The 
HSSPII explicitly acknowledges that the cost of fully providing the EHP exceeds the resources 
available for its provision. A number of related issues are outlined which could impact EHP provision 
including; lack of awareness of the EHP among stakeholders, lack of EHP policy enforcement, 
inequalities in utilisation and not linking health system inputs to the EHP. 
 
Table 3 below outlines the interventions included in the EHP and the level at which they are 
provided. 
 
dĂďůĞ ? PDĂůĂǁŝ ?Ɛ,WĂƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ,^^W// 
Category 
Intervention 
Package Intervention 
Level of 
Care 
RMNCH 
ANC Package 
 
Tetanus toxoid (pregnant women) 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Deworming (pregnant women) 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Daily iron and folic acid supplementation (pregnant 
women) 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Syphilis detection and treatment (pregnant women) 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
IPT (pregnant women) 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
ITN distribution to pregnant women  
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Urinalysis (4 per pregnant woman) 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Modern 
Family 
Planning 
Injectable 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
IUD 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Implant 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Pill 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Female sterilization Secondary 
Male condom 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
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Delivery 
Package 
Clean practices and immediate essential new-born 
care (in facility) 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Active management of the 3rd stage of labour 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Management of eclampsia/pre-eclampsia 
(Magnesium sulphate, Methyldopa, Nifedipine, 
Hydralazine) 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Neonatal resuscitation (institutional) 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Caesarean section with indication Secondary 
Caesarean section with indication (with 
complication) Secondary 
Vaginal delivery, skilled attendance (including 
complications) 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Management of obstructed labour 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Newborn sepsis - full supportive care 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Newborn sepsis  ? injectable antibiotics 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Antenatal corticosteroids for preterm labour 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Maternal sepsis case management 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Cord Care Using Chlorhexidine 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
 
Hysterectomy 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
 Post-abortion case management Secondary  
 
Treatment of antepartum haemorrhage 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
 Treatment of postpartum haemorrhage Secondary 
 
Antibiotics for pPRoM 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Vaccine 
Preventable 
diseases 
Essential 
Vaccines 
Package 
Rotavirus vaccine 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Measles Rubella vaccine 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Pneumococcal vaccine 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
BCG vaccine 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Polio vaccine 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
DPT-Heb-Hib / Pentavalent vaccine 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
HPV vaccine 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
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Malaria 
First Line 
uncomplicate
d Malaria 
treatment 
Uncomplicated (adult, <36 kg) 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Uncomplicated (adult, >36 kg) 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Uncomplicated (children, <15 kg) 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Uncomplicated (children, >15 kg) 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Complicated 
Malaria 
treatment 
Complicated (adults, injectable artesunate) 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Complicated (children, injectable artesunate) 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Malaria 
Diagnosis 
RDTs 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Microscopy for Malaria 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Integrated 
management 
of childhood 
illnesses 
(IMCI) 
ARIs Pneumonia treatment (children) 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Treatment of severe pneumonia (Oxygen) 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Diarrhoeal 
Disease 
ORS 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Zinc 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Treatment of severe diarrhoea (IV Fluids) 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Nutrition 
Community management of nutrition in under-5 - 
Plumpy Peanut 
Community/
Primary 
Community management of nutrition in under-5 - 
micronutrient powder 
Community/
Primary 
Community management of nutrition in under-5 - 
vitamin A 
Community/
Primary 
Malaria 
Diagnosis RDTs for under-5 
Community/
Primary 
Community 
Health 
Community 
Health 
Package 
Growth Monitoring 
Community/
Primary 
Vermin and Vector Control & Promotion 
Community/
Primary 
Disease Surveillance 
Community/
Primary 
Community Health Promotion & Engagement 
Community/
Primary 
Village Inspections 
Community/
Primary 
Promotion of hygiene (hand washing with soap) 
Community/
Primary 
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Promotion of Sanitation (latrine refuse, drop hole 
covers, solid waste disposal, hygienic disposal of 
ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐƐƚŽŽůƐ ? 
Community/
Primary 
Occupational Health Promotion 
Community/
Primary 
Household water quality testing and treatment 
Community/
Primary 
Home-based care of chronically ill patients 
Community/
Primary 
Child Protection 
Community/
Primary 
NTDs 
Treatment 
and MDA 
Schistosomiasis mass drug administration 
Community/
Primary 
Case finding and treatment of Trypanosomiasis Primary 
Trachoma mass drug administration 
Community/
Primary 
HIV/AIDS 
HIV 
Prevention 
Cotrimoxazole for children 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
PMTCT 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
HIV Testing 
HIV Testing Services (HTS) 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
HIV 
Treatment 
HIV Treatment for all ages  ? ART & Viral Load 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Nutrition 
 
Vitamin A supplementation in pregnant women 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
 
Management of severe malnutrition (children) 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
 
Deworming (children) 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
 Vitamin A supplementation in infants and children 6-
59 months 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
TB 
 
Isonized Preventive Therapy for children in contact 
with TB patients 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
 
First line treatment for new TB Cases for adults 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
 
First line treatment for retreatment TB Cases for 
adults 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
 
First line treatment for new TB Cases for children 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
 First line treatment for retreatment TB Cases for 
children 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
 
Case management of MDR cases 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
TB Testing 
LED test 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
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Xpert test 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
MGIT test  
Primary/ 
Secondary 
LJ test 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
NCDs 
 
Treatment of Injuries 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Mental Health 
treatment 
Basic psychosocial support, advice, and follow-up 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Anti-epileptic medication 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Treatment of depression (first line) 
Community/
Primary/ 
Secondary 
 
Testing of pre-cancerous cells (vinegar) 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Diabetes 
treatment 
Diabetes Type I 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Diabetes Type II 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
 
Hypertension 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Oral Health 
Tooth pain 
treatment 
Management of severe tooth pain, tooth extraction 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
Management of mild tooth pain, tooth filling 
Primary/ 
Secondary 
 
Data on patient populations comes from a mid-term re-costing of the Health Sector Strategic Plan 
(2011-2016) undertaken by Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI) in 2014. For each intervention the 
target population (e.g. pregnant women, women in need of PMTCT, etc.) was identified. The cost of 
each intervention was calculated using a bottom-up ingredients based approach but only reflects 
drug and supply inputs rather than a cost per patient treated. 
